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THE DEVELOPMENT OF REVENUE BOND
FINANCING OF MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC
UTILITY SYSTEMS IN KENTUCKY
INTRODUCTION

The power of the legislature to authorize municipal corporations to supply gas and water for municipal purposes, and for the
use and benefit of such of their inhabitants as wish to use and are
willing to pay therefor at reasonable rates, has never been seriously
questioned. In view of the fact that electricity is so rapidly coming
into general use for illuminating streets, public and private buildings, dwellings, etc., why should there be any doubt as to the power
to authorize such corporations to manufacture and supply it in
like manner as artificial gas has been manufactured and supplied?
It is a mistake to assume that municipal corporations should not
keep abreast with the progress and improvements of the age.1
The above statement was made by the Pennsylvania Court in
1894. Electricity has long since come into general use for more purposes than any court of that day could have imagined; however, the
demand for electric power "to keep abreast with the progress and
improvements of the ag&' has not changed. One of the biggest problems in meeting the demand has been finding means to finance the
development of municipal public utility systems within the constitutional limitations of municipal indebtedness. In Kentucky, as in
other jurisdictions, revenue bond financing as authorized by statute
has become the most popular means of dealing with the existing constitutional limitations. The indebtedness created by the issuance of
revenue bonds by a municipality does not constitute an indebtedness
of the municipality within constitutional restrictions because revenue
bonds are payable only from special funds rather than from the general
funds of the city.
A municipality is an agent of the state and has been described as
"a governmental unit, subservient to the state, performing certain
definite functions delegated to it by the legislative body of the state,
within prescribed constitutional restrictions."2 The Kentucky Constitution of 1891 provides for the creation of six classes of cities.3 The
1
2

Linn v. Chambersburg, 28 A. 842, 846 (Pa. 1894).
Meuth, The Development of Financing Public Improvements by Kentucky
Municipalities 25 Ky. L.J. 230 (1937). See also, City of Covington v. Kentucky,
173 U.S. 231 (1899); Mayor v. Bay, 86 U.S. 468 (1873); Green County v. Shortel,

75 S.W.
251 (Ky. 1903); City of Louisville v. Commonwealth, 62 Ky. 295 (1864).
3
Ky. CONST. § 156.
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1893 General Assembly adopted charters for cities of the first,4 third,'
fourth,6 fifth 7 and sixth s classes; the 1894 General Assembly did the
same for cities of the second class.9 Under these charters, cities,
except those of the sixth class, were given authority to make contracts
to provide lighting for streets and public buildings. Cities of the third
class were authorized to provide lighting for streets and public buildings either by contract or by facilities acquired or constructed; they
were also authorized to furnish light, heat and power to consumers
located within their corporate limits. Nevertheless, this authority was
limited by constitutional restrictions which affected the ability of the
municipality to finance such projects. It is the purpose of this paper
to examine the development of the statutory regulations for financing
municipal electrical systems within the constitutional framework. This
will be done by looking first at the constitutional provisions and then
considering the statutes which were passed to meet these constitutional
requirements.
CONSITrO

ONAL PROvISIONS

Restrictions and Limitations
While the Kentucky Constitution places several restrictions of a
financial nature on municipalities, the most significant are those contained in Sections 157 and 158. Section 157 establishes the maximum
tax rate for towns and cities.'0 In addition, it provides that:
[n]o county, city, town, taxing district, or other municipality, shall

be authorized or permitted to become indebted, in any manner or
for any purpose, to an amount exceeding, in any year, the income
and revenue provided for such year, without the assent of two-

thirds of the voters thereof, voting at an election to be held for that
purpose; and any indebtedness contracted in violation of this section shall be void....
Section 158 sets out the authorized maximum indebtedness of municipalities in terms of percentages of the value of taxable property.
These percentage limitations vary from ten to two percent depending
4 Ky. Acts, ch. 244 (1893).

SKy. Acts, ch. 222 (1893).
6 Ky. Acts, ch. 241 (1893).
78 Ky. Acts, ch. 250 (1893).
Ky. Acts, ch. 196 (1893).
SKy. Acts, ch. 100 (1894).
10 The maximum tax rate is $1.50/$100 of taxable property for towns and cities
having a population of 15,000 or more; $1.00/$100 for towns and cities having a
population of not less than 10,000 nor more than 15,000; $.75/$100 for towns and

cities having a population less than 10,000; and $.50/$100 for counties and taxing
districts. Ky. CONST. § 157.
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upon the type of taxing district and its population" However, Section 158 contains an exception which allows a municipality to exceed
the stated maximum indebtedness where an emergency to the public
health or safety exists. It was left to the courts to determine just what
constituted such an "emergency." Other constitutional restrictions are
the requirements that a tax be levied which is sufficient to pay the
indebtedness in not more than forty years,' 2 that the credit of the
state not be loaned,'3 and that the laws for borrowing money specify
4
the purpose for which the loan is to be used.'
Application of the Constitutional Provisions
The first cities which sought to provide electric power, under the
authorization of their charters, attempted to do so by the use of general
obligation bonds within the limitations of the Kentucky Constitution.
In 1912, Murray, Kentucky, a city of the fifth class, attempted to construct an electric light plant and water works system which would be
financed by an issuance of general obligation bonds.' 5 Since the indebtedness to be incurred under the proposed plan would be more
than the income and revenue for the period, the question had to be
presented to the voters in an election as required by the Kentucky
Constitution.'" Two-thirds of the citizens voting in the election
favored the issuance of these bonds to finance the electric light plant
and water-works system. The new issue of bonds, together with the
outstanding indebtedness of the city, did not exceed the three percent
ceiling set by the Constitution for cities of the fifth classy7 and the
obligation created by the indebtedness would not require a rate of
taxation greater than that allowed by the Constitution.' 8 Thus, the
Kentucky Court of Appeals upheld the authority of Murray to acquire
and operate a city-owned electric light plant with funds obtained by
an issuance of general obligation bonds. 19
In a later case,20 the court noted by way of dicta that it was
lThe maximum indebtedness is 10% of the value of taxable property for

cities of the first and second classes and cities of the third class which have a
population over 15,000; 5% for cities of the third class with a population less than
15,000 and cities of the fourth class; 8% for cities of the fifth and sixth classes;
2% for
counties and taxing districts and other municipalities. Ky. CoNsT. § 158.
12
Ky. CONST. § 159.
13 Ky. CONST. § 177.
14 Ky. CONSr. § 178.

15 Swann v. City of Murray, 142 S.W. 244 (Ky. 1912).
16 Ky. CONST. § 157.
'7 Ky. CONST. § 158.

Is Ky. CONST. § 157.
19 Swanm v. City of Murray, 142 S.W. 244 (Ky. 1912).
20 Juett v. Town of Williamstown, 58 S.W.2d 411 (Ky. 1933).
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thoroughly settled that a city could own and operate an electric utility
plant in order to light public streets and other public places and could
sell any surplus electric power to its inhabitants. 21 But, not every city
that wanted to acquire an electric light plant and water system was
able to do so within the limitations established by the Constitution. In
1919, Clinton,22 a city of the fifth class, attempted to acquire a joint
municipal electric and water system. An ordinance was passed approving the issuance of $30,000 in additional general obligation bonds
to finance the project although the city had an existing outstanding
indebtedness of $10,500. Since the bond issue exceeded the income
and revenue for the year, this ordinance was presented to the voters
at a regular election and was approved by the necessary two-thirds
majority. Clinton's bond issue, however, would have created a combined municipal indebtedness exceeding that authorized by Section
158 of the Constitution. 23 When the question came before the Court
of Appeals, the city argued that an emergency existed which would
allow the bond issue under the emergency exception clause of Section
158. The Court stated that, if an "emergency" of the type contemplated by the Constitution did in fact exist, the city would have been
authorized to incur the additional debt; however, by the terms of the
Constitution, an "emergency" means "perils to the public health and
safety, and eliminates any mere apparent necessities growing out of
conveniences or out of conditions which are merely inconvenient to
be borne."24 While noting that under the circumstances of this case,
the need to maintain the city's water supply might constitute such an
"emergency," the Court held that the city's plan to construct a joint
water and electric system could not be upheld because the need for
electricity did not present such an "emergency."25
LEGISLATIVE PROISIONS

The 1932 Act: Authorization for Third Class Cities
The legislature first authorized the use of revenue bonds to finance
electric utility system with the passage of an act in 1932 entitled, An
Act enabling cities of the third class to acquire, construct, operate and
maintain electric light, heat and power plant and to issue revenue
bonds of such cities to pay the cost thereof, payable solely from the
21 Id.at 413.
22 Samuels v. City of Clinton, 211 S.W. 567 (Ky. 1919).
23 See note 11 supra.
24 Samuels v. City of Clinron, 211 S.W. 567, 569 (Ky. 1919).
25 Id. at 570.
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revenues of such works without the incurrance of indebtedness of said
cities.26 Section 1 provided that cities of the third class were:
authorized and empowered to purchase, establish, erect, maintain
and operate electric light, beat and power plants, together with
extensions and necessary appurtenances thereto, within or without
the corporate limits under the provisions of this act for the purpose
of supplying such city and the inhabitants thereof with electric
27
light heat and power.
Section 2 of the same act provided that, in order to defray the cost of
such plants, these cities could:
borrow money and issue negotiable bonds, provided no such bonds
shall be issued unless and until authorized by an ordinance specifying the proposed undertaking, the amount of the bonds to be
issued and the maximum rate of interest such bonds are to bear,
which shall not be more than six (6) per cent per annum. Such
ordinance shall further provide that the proposed electric light,
heat and power plant and appurtenances which is to be acquired
or constructed or the proposed extension thereto are to be made
pursuant to the provisions of this act.2 8
The bonds issued under the act were to be for a period not
exceeding 40 years and were to be payable solely from the income
and revenue earned by the light, heat and power plants authorized
by this act. Therefore these bonds would not constitute an indebtedness of the city "within the meaning of the Constitutional provisions
or limitations,"29 Section 5 of the act contained the provision that:
[iut shall be plainly stated on the face of each bond that same has
been issued under the provisions of this act and that it does not
constitute an indebtedness of such city within the meaning of any
constitutional provisions or limitations.8 0

The act instructed the city council or board of commissioners to
create a "separate and special fund" for the income and revenue from
the plants so that this money would be used only to pay for the cost
and maintenance of the plants. The rates to be charged for the services
of the plant were to be set and revised from time to time so that there
would be sufficient funds for these purposes. It was also designated
by the act that the city was to pay the reasonable cost and value for
services rendered to the city.8 ' Section 20 of the act provided for the
26Kj. Acts, ch. 119 (1932).
271 d., § 1.
28 Id., § 2.
29 Id., § 5.
80 Id.
81 Id., § 9.
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creation of a city utility commission. This commission was to be
appointed by ordinance and was to have exclusive control over the
32
operation of the electric plant
The language of the 1932 act applied only to cities of the third
class. However, in October 1932, Williamstown, Kentucky,33 a city of
the sixth class, attempted to obtain funds for an electric system under
a plan similar to that outlined in the 1932 act. Under the Williamstown
plan, the city passed an ordinance calling for the issuance of bonds
in the amount of $75,000. The proceeds from the bond issues were
to be used to construct a municipal electric light and power plant
which would be owned and operated by the city. The same ordinance
provided for the creation of a "Bond and Interest Redemption Account" funded by incomes and revenues from the plant sufficient to
pay the interest and to retire the bonds when they became due. It
was noted on the bonds that they were payable solely from this special
fund and did not constitute an indebtedness of the city within the
constitutional provisions or limitations. A taxpayer brought suit to
challenge the city's action on the grounds that: (1) the city had
obligated itself by the terms of the ordinance and, therefore, the debt
would violate Sections 157 and 158 of the Constitution; and (2) the
city had no authority to obtain funds with which to construct, operate
and maintain an electric light and power plant in the proposed
34
manner.
As to plaintiff's first contention, that the bond issue created an
obligation of the city, the Kentucky Court of Appeals held, as they had
consistently held, that revenue bonds do not create an indebtedness
of the municipality within the meaning of the Constitution because
revenue bonds are payable from a special fund and not from the
general fund of the municipality. 35 In the instant case, the city could
issue bonds which would not obligate the city within the meaning of
the Constitution 0 because the bonds were to be payable from a special
fund established from the revenue received for the services furnished
by the plant.3 7 The taxpayer's second contention38 presented the
Court with a novel question. In deciding whether a city of the sixth
32
3S

Id., § 20.

Juett v. Town of Williamstown, 58 S.W.2d 411 (Ky. 1933).

34 Id. at 412.
335 Id.

6 For cases holding that revenue bonds do not constitute an indebtedness of
the municipality see, Kentucky Utfl. Co. v. City of Paris, 58 S.W.2d 361 (Ky.
1933); Wheeler v. Board of Comm'rs, 53 S.W.2d 740 (Ky. 1932); Williams v. City
of Raceland, 53 S.W.2d 370 (Ky. 1932); City of Bowling Green v. Kirby, 295
S.W. 1004 (Ky. 1927).
37 Juett v. Town of Williamstown, 58 S.W.2d 411, 412 (Ky. 1933).
38 Id.
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class could obtain and operate an electric light plant under the
Williamstown plan, the Court looked first to the statutes and found
"no express statutory authority for a city of the sixth class to acquire
and operate an electric light plant under the proposed plan 3 9 In
upholding the circuit court's decision that no authority existed for a
city of the sixth class to acquire and operate an electric light plant
under the proposed plan, the Court of Appeals stated: "Municipal
corporations possess only such powers as are expressly given, or
necessarily implied, in statutes constitutionally enacted, and, if there
be a fair and reasonable doubt of the existence of the power, it should
be resolved against the municipality."40 Statutory authority for such
a plan was provided for cities of the sixth class when the legislature
amended its 1932 act.41
The 1986 Act: Authority for Second, Fourth,
Fifth and Sixth Class Cities
In 1936 the General Assembly amended the 1932 act to provide
statutory authority for the revenue bond financing of electric utility
systems for cities of the second, fourth, fifth and sixth classes as well
as for cities of the third class. 42 In addition, the 1936 act contained a
provision requiring approval of an ordinance authorizing the bond
issue by a majority of the voters voting at a regular election.43 In
Booth v. City of Owensboro44 the constitutionality of the election
provision was raised because it was not mentioned in the title to the
1936 amendment 45 as required by the Kentucky Constitution. 46 While
refusing to decide the question as it applied to cities of the second,
fourth, fifth and sixth classes, the Court held that the election pro47
vision was unconstitutional as it applied to cities of the third class.
In so holding the Court reasoned:
We think this instance is a clear exemplification of [Section 51!s]
wisdom and a striking example of its violation. The title to the
1936 amendment only advised that the proposed act merely extended to other cities the existing statute enabling cities of the
third class to acquire or improve their electric plants and thus
bring the law on the subject in harmony with the law relating to
39 Id. at 413.
40 id.
41 K. Acts, ch. 77 (1936).
42 Id.
43

1d.

122 S.W.2d 118 (Ky. 1938).
45Ky. Acts, ch. 77 (1936).
44

46KY. CONST. § 51.

47Booth v. City of Owensboro, 122 S.W.2d 118 (Ky. 1938).
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their water works. The title indicates only extension. The body
contains a substantial restriction. Its omission was concealment.

Members of the legislature particularly interested in legislation

affecting cities of the third class could not have known from reading
the title that their existing power as to this subject was being
materially curbed. No member was advised by the title that the
extension of the authority to cities of the other classes was being
likewise limited. The people who are usually apprised of proposed

legislation through publication of only the title of pending bills
or the substance thereof in the Legislative Digest and newspapers
48
probably were never informed of this change in the existing law.
Three years later, the Court was faced with the question of the constitutionality of the election provision in the 1936 Act as it applied
to other classes of cities49 and reached the same result it had reached
in Booth, holding the election provision unconstitutional as it applied
to cities of the second, fourth, fifth and sixth classes.
The 1936 enactment provided statutory authority for cities to use
municipal revenue bonds to finance electric utilities systems. However, as municipalities sought to meet their individual needs, the Court
would be called upon to answer additional questions concerning the
revenue bond financing of such systems. One such question which
would be presented to the Court was whether or not a city could use
revenue bonds to finance a joint water and electric system for the
city.5 9 In Eagle v. City of Corbin,51 Corbin proposed to issue bonds to
finance the rehabilitation of its electric light and power facilities and
water works. The bond issue was to be paid from the income and revenue
of the systems. In looking to statutory authority, the Court of Appeals
found not one but two statutes. One provided for the creation of a
water system the other for the creation of an electric plant. The
statutes were similar, however, and the Court held that there was no
reason why bonds should not be issued for a unified plant if the
provisions of both statutes had been observed. 52 The statute which
provided for the issuance of revenue bonds to finance electric plants
also provided for the creation of a city utility commission, and at the
time this action was brought, Corbin had no such commission. On
this point the Court said that there was nothing in the statute to
indicate that the creation of the commission was a condition precedent
to the issuance of bonds. Rather, the court found the purpose of this
part of the statute was "to obtain a non-political and business man48

Id. at 120.

49 Jones v. City of Benton, 148 S.W.2d 683 (Ky. 1941).

GOEagle v. City of Corbin, 122 S.W.2d 798 (Ky. 1938).

51 ld.
52

Id. at 800-801.
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agement of the plant in order to protect the bond holders and the
inhabitants... ."53 Thus, the Court took the view that the law would
be complied with at the proper time and that Corbin would appoint
a city utility commission.
The Court also discussed the circumstances surrounding the
issuance of bonds. In Eagle, the city entered into a contract with the
purchaser of the bonds before they were authorized. 54 In addition,
the purchaser was the only person to whom the city offered the bonds,
and there had been no public advertisement of the bond issue. The
city maintained that this was not required by the statute. In pointing
out that public policy is declared first by the Constitution, second by
the legislature, and third by the courts, the Court stated: "There are
broad constitutional and statutory declarations as to public policy in
respect to similar municipal transactions, namely, that public business
is never a private matter."55 As to the statutes authorizing the issuance
of revenue bonds to finance electric light plants, the Court said that
while the city councils or commissions were granted broad discretionary powers in the creation and sale of bonds, these powers could
not be used to the extent of avoiding public and reasonable bids.56
Revenue Bond Planv. General Obligation Bond Plan
The above survey of cases and statutes indicates that there are two
methods by which cities may acquire, construct or extend electric
utility systems. To some extent, the method to be adopted by the city
depends on whether the source of funds for the project is to be the
sale of revenue bonds or the sale of general obligation bonds. In
King v. Rowland,57 the Kentucky Court of Appeals discussed the
difference in these two possibilities in terms of requirements for voter
approval and for the appointment of a city utility commission. The
sale of general obligation bonds requires that the question be
submitted to voters of the city at an election held for that purpose,
whereas the sale of revenue bonds to finance the project does not
provide for an election unless a petition signed by 200 qualified voters
is filed in support of an election on the issue. A city utility commission need not be appointed when the cost is financed by the
issuance of general obligation bonds; however, when the cost is
financed by the issuance of revenue bonds, the city is required by
53Id
at 801; see note 32 supra and accompanying text.
54
Eagle v. City of Corbin, 122 S.W.2d 798, 802 (Ky. 1938).
55Id at 803.
56Id.

57 168 S.W.2d 755 (Ky. 1943).
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statute to appoint such a commission. 58 The reason for requiring the
appointment of a city utility commission in cases where the electric
system is to be financed by revenue bonds is to create an independent
authority to manage the revenue derived from the operation of the
plant because revenue bond holders must look exclusively to revenues
derived from the operation of the plant for securing their bonds. 59
The "city utility commission when appointed acts as trustee for the
bondholders....

."60

It is not necessary to have a city utility commis-

sion in the case of general obligation bonds because these bonds are
backed by the full faith and credit of the state i.e. all the taxable
property of the state. Since revenue bonds are not backed by the fall
faith and credit of the state but are payable solely out of incomes and
revenues from the projects for which they are issued, it has consistently been held that municipal revenue bonds are not subject to
the same constitutional restrictions which are imposed on the issuance
of general obligation bonds. 61 Therefore it is not surprising that the
use of revenue bonds to finance municipal capital improvements has
had tremendous growth in recent years. Not only has their use
prompted new projects, but they have also funded the construction
of larger municipal electric utility systems than previously existed.
Primary Purpose Question
In 1961, the Kentucky Court of Appeals was called upon to decide
if a municipality, when providing for a generating plant to meet
present needs, had authority under KRS § 96.520 to construct and
operate a plant adequate to meet future needs of the city and to sell
the present excess kilowatts to a private company. In Miller v. City of
Owensboro,6 2 a taxpayer argued that the plan contemplated by the
city for "construction, financing and operation of a new generating
station" was not authorized by KRS § 96.520. His contention was
founded on the theory that this statute only authorized a city to
acquire and operate an electric light plant for the purpose of supplying
the city and its inhabitants with electric power. The taxpayer maintained that the Owensboro plan was designed primarily for the benefit
58 Id. at 756.
59 Id.

Id.
(1 SelIe v. City of Henderson, 218 S.W.2d 645 (Ky. 1949); McKinney v. City
of Owensboro, 203 S.W.2d 24 (Ky. 1947); Cawood v. Coleman, 172 S.W.2d 548
(Ky. 1943); Davis v. Board of Educ., 83 S.W.2d 34 (Ky. 1935); Reconstruction
Fin. Corp. v. City of Richmond, 61 S.W.2d 631 (Ky. 1933); Wheeler v. Board of
Com'rs 53 S.W.2d 740 (Ky. 1932); Klein v. City of Louisville, 6 S.W.2d 1104
(Ky. 1928); City of Bowling Green v. Kirby, 295 S.W. 1004 (Ky. 1927).
60

62 343 S.W.2d 398 (Ky. 1961).
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of Kentucky Utilities Company and only secondarily for the benefit
of the city and its inhabitants. Owensboro already owned an electric
plant, but this plant supplied only 22,500 kilowatts while the requirements of the city and its inhabitants were in excess of 40,000 kilowatts. The present plan had space for one additional generator
but that would not be sufficient to meet the city's need after 1968.
The new generating station planned by the city would have an initial
capacity of 125,000 kilowatts with space for an eventual capacity of
800,000 kilowatts. This station would be in addition to the existing
plant, and the city would contract to sell the excess power to Kentucky
Utilities Company. In holding that the plant was primarily designed
to meet the needs of the city of Owensboro and its inhabitants and
thus authorized by KRS § 96.520, the Court reasoned that it was a
matter of sound economic planning to construct a plant capable of
generating enough electric energy to meet the future needs of the
city and its inhabitants. With respect to the sale of the excess to
Kentucky Utilities Company, the Court noted that this was "an
advantageous means of realizing a return on the excess capacity rather
63
than allowing it to constitute an economic loss."
In 1970, the statute allowing cities of the second, third, fourth,
fifth and sixth classes to construct and operate electric power plants
was amended to authorize cities to:
enter into and fulfill the terms of an interconnection agreement
with any utility whose rates and services are regulated by the
Public Service Commission of Kentucky (or, if not so regulated,
operating and having customers only outside of Kentucky) and [to]
establish, erect, maintain and operate such plants, individually or
jointly with any such utility. In the case of any joint action such
city and utility may provide by contract for their respective responsibilities, for operation and maintenance and for the allocation
of expenses, revenues and power. If in the accomplishment of
such purpose such city at any time has capacity or energy surplus
to the immediate needs of the city and its inhabitants, such surplus, if not disposed of for consumption outside this state, may be
disposed of only to a utility whose rates and services
are regu64
lated by the Public Service Commission of Kentucky.
...

However, the statute, as amended, still required that the plant be
"for the purpose of supplying the city and its inhabitants with electric
light, heat and power."65
In the same year as this statute was amended, the Court of
63 Id. at 401.
64 KRS § 96.520(1) (Supp. 1971).
65 Id.
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Appeals decided Wilson v. City of Henderson."" In this case, the city
of Henderson maintained that its plan should be upheld under the
authority of Miller v. City of Owensboro.67 Yet, there appear to be
some essential differences between the two cases. One significant
divergency was the adequacy of the output of the existing electric
plants of the two cities at the time the question arose in each case.
The Henderson system had a generating capacity of 48,000 kilowatts
and a maximum load requirement of only 34,800 kilowatts. So while
the existing Henderson plant was capable of generating some 13,000
more kilowatts than were required by the city, the existing Owensboro
plant was capable of generating only about one-half as many kilowatts
as the city needed at that time. This differences in the existing
systems of the two cities was completely overlooked by the Court.
Another difference which the Court did discuss in the Henderson
case was the firm capacity 8 of the present Henderson system, which
was somewhat less than the existing needs of the city and its inhabitants. The city had interconnection agreements with other systems,
however, which gave it an over-all firm capacity of 44,000 kilowatts.
This overall firm capacity exceeded its needs. But, the Court placed
more emphasis on its expected growth, which was predicted to exceed
the over-all firm capacity. Firm capacity was not discussed in the
Owensboro case because the full generating capacity of the Owensboro
plant was not enough to meet the city's needs.
Henderson's expansion plan called "for the construction of two
new generating units, each having a capacity of 175,000 kilowatts."6 9
The construction of the plant was to be financed by the issuance of
$76,000,000 in tax-exempt revenue bonds. This meant that the city
would have a generating capacity of 398,000 kilowatts with an excess
of 363,000 kilowatts. The city entered into an agreement with Big
Rivers, a private corporation, which provided that:
[t]he units [would] be erected on land adjoining an existing
generating plant of Big Rivers. Under 30-year contracts, Big
Rivers and the city [would] utilize jointly certain auxiliary
facilities such as those for coal handling, water circulation and
disposal, barge unloading and rail traffic; Big Rivers [would] provide personnel for physical operation of the city's new generating
units; and Big Rivers [would] purchase all of70the power generated
by the new units in excess of the city's needs.
66461 S.W.2d 90 (Ky. 1970).
67
343 S.W.2d 398 (Ky. 1961).
68
The firm capacity of a plant is its generating capacity with the largest
individual generator out of commission.
69 461 S.W.2d 90, 92 (Ky. 1970).
70 Id.
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While there was specific statutory authority for all the elements of the
agreements between the city and Big Rivers, there was no authority
for any of the plan unless the plant was for the purpose of supplying
electrical energy to the city and its inhabitants. A majority of the
71
Court held that under the authority of Miller v. City of Owensboro
the Henderson plan was for the benefit of the city and its inhabitants.
Thus, there was statutory authority for Henderson's plan and it was
upheld.72 There was a strong dissent in the case which pointed out
that "the law is clear and unambiguous that this facility cannot be
constructed nor these bonds issued unless the primary purpose of the
project is to furnish and supply the city and its inhabitants with
electric power."73 And yet, the majority of the Court, seemingly ignoring the fact that Henderson had a first rate electrical system capable
of generating more electric energy than the city presently needed,
allowed bonds to be issued to finance a new generating plant. The
combined effect of both the city's plants would give the city an
excess of 363,000 kilowatts in 1970 which would be sold to Big Rivers.
The dissenting opinion further pointed out that the excess capacity
figures made it so obvious that the primary purpose of the construction
of the facilities was to furnish power to Big Rivers that it was "amazing,
74
appalling and confounding" that the Court held to the contrary.
The dissent further observed that the design of the system and the
questions presented to the Court forced the Court "to play with a
75
stacked deek"
CONCLUSION

As noted above, recent cases78 indicate that the Kentucky Court
of Appeals no longer maintains the position that when there is reasonable doubt as to the existence of a municipality's power to finance
an electric utility system, the question should be resolved against the
municipality. Although when Miller v. City of Owensboro77 was
decided there was no statutory authority allowing a municipality to
make a contract to sell excess electric energy to another utility com71343 S.W.2d 398 (Ky. 1961).

72This was a four to three decision. Chief Judge Hill and Judges Milliken,
Palmore and Steinfeld made up the majority. Judge Osborne wrote a dissenting
opinion in which Judges Neildirk and Reed joined.
7 Wilson v. City of Henderson, 461 S.W.2d 90, 97 (Ky. 1970) (emphasis in
the original).
74 Id.
75 Id. at 98.
76 Wilson v. City of Henderson, 461 S.W.2d 90 (Ky. 1970); Miller v. City of
Owensboro, 843 S.W.2d 398 (Ky. 1961).
77 343 S.W.2d 398 (Ky. 1961).
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pany, the Court upheld Owensboro's authority to do so, declaring
that the primary purpose of the plan was to supply the city of Owensboro and its inhabitants with electric energy. In Wilson v. City of
Henderson,7 8 the Court reduced this principle to meaningless dogma
by upholding a plan whereby the city was allowed to construct a plant
capable of producing over ten times more kilowatts of electricity than
the city and its inhabitants needed. As a result of this judicial legislation in Wilson there apparently exists authority for any municipality
to issue tax-exempt revenue bonds to finance the construction and
operation of an electric utility system capable of producing unlimited
excess kilowatts.
Joyce M. Russell

78 461 S.W.2d 90 (Ky. 1970).

